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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Abstracts of Recent Criminal Cases
Persons Convicted of Same Crime Can be Given
Different Sentences-Jung v. State, 145 N.W. 2d
684 (Wis. 1966). Defendant, the driver of the
get-away car, was convicted of armed robbery,
attempted murder, and of concealing his identity,
and was sentenced to two consecutive 30-year
terms. He contended that his right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment was
violated since two of his co-felons received sen-
tences which were less than his. The court up-
held the sentences stating that persons con-
victed of the same crime could be sentenced
differently depending upon their individual culpa-
bility and need for rehabilitation.
The defendant agreed that different sentences
could be justified, but claimed that in his case the
disparity was not based on culpability or rehabili-
tation. He stated that he had not carried a gun
nor did he participate directly in the robbery as
did the others. And unlike his companions he had
no criminal record. He claimed that his greater
sentence was because of the fact that he had
pleaded not guilty whereas the others had pleaded
guilty. The court stated that if this were true, the
defendant's rights would have been violated, but
it found that his plea was not a factor in the trial
court's sentencing. It concluded by saying that
the right of "equality of treatment ... does not
destroy the individualization of sentencing to fit
the individual" as long as there is "substantially
the same sentence for persons having substantially
the same case histories".
Comment: The court spends much time on
dicta to the effect that a defendant's plea should
not be a basis for his sentence. Thus although the
defendant's sentence in this case may not have
been excessive, it would be improper for his co-
felons to receive a lighter punishment. The state
admitted that the other felons received lesser
sentences because of their co-operation. Although
this has been the practice in the past, it may not
necessarily be proper. It could tend to induce
innocent persons to plead guilty. As stated in
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United States v. Wiley, 267 F. 2d 453, 455 (7th
Cir. 1959) which the court here cited, "a defendant
in a criminal case should not be punished by a
heavy sentence merely because he exercised his
constitutional right to be tried before an impartial
judge or jury".
Admissibility of Experiments Simulating Facts of
the Case--People v. Miller, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720
(Dist. Ct. of App. 1966). Defendant was convicted
of first degree murder and apepaled. One of the con-
tentions was that prosecution evidence of three
experiments was not admissible on the grounds
that there was no similarity of conditions between
the facts of the case and those of the experiments.
The court dismissed this contention and upheld
the conviction.
The defendant claimed that her husband's
death was due to a flat tire, and subsequent acci-
dent and fire, which occurred while she was driving
with him in their car. There was a nail found in
one of the tires and defendant contended this
might have caused the blowoat. The first experi-
ment consisted of driving at high speed with a
nail in a tire with no resultant loss of air. Defend-
ant stated that her tire picked up the nail while
moving whereas in the experiment, the tire re-
ceived the nail while stationary. The court held
that this sole dissimilarity was not sufficient to
cause the action of the trial court in admitting the
evidence to be an abuse of the court's discretion.
Quoting from Beresford v. Pacific Gas and Electric
Co., 45 Cal. 2d. 738, it stated that "the conditions
surrounding a test or experiment... need not be
identical with those existing at the time of the
occurrence in question, providing there is sub-
stantial similarity".
The second experiment was to test the amount
of pull necessary to remove the tubing from a gas
line when dry, wet and very wet. The experiment
was held to be sufficiently similar to the facts of
the case since, although the defendant's gas line
was not dry, the experiment also included tests on
wet ones. The third experiment consisted of burn-
ing the type of car in which the accident occurred
to prove that it could not have burned the way it
did without an accelerant. The court upheld the
admission of the experiment stating that "the
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[trial] court considered carefully the contentions of
defendant as to dissimilarity of conditions and
was of the opinion that the dissimilarity was not
such as to affect the validity of the experiment".
Thus the court held that there was no abuse of
discretion in the allowance of evidence of the
three experiments.
Motion to Suppress Evidence Should be Heard
Independently Prior to TriaL.-Stae v. Young, 220
N.E. 2d 704 (Ohio, 1966). Defendant was con-
victed for possession of "numbers games" tickets.
He filed two motions to suppress evidence prior to
the trial. The trial court, with the acquiescence of
defense counsel, decided to begin the trial, hear
the evidence, and then consider the motion. At the
conclusion of the evidence, which was admitted
over the objection of the defendant, the motion to
be heard solely upon the suppression of evidence
was denied on the ground that the defendant
could not take the stand for such a limited pur-
pose. Thus the defendant did not testify at trial
as to the nature of the evidence which was used
to convict him.
The appellate court reversed the conviction
stating that "the motion to suppress should have
been heard independently prior to trial". Once
the improper evidence is presented to the jury, it
cannot be withdrawn after the trial is completed.
The court noted that "the suppression of evidence
at the conclusion of the trial would obviously be
no more than an empty gesture". In a situation
where the evidence has already been heard by the
court the defendant is "at least entitled to an in-
dependent hearing upon the motion without
submitting himself at the trial itself and without
having the same evidence presented upon the
motion used in the determination of his guilt or
innocence".
Right to Counsel Not Waived by Silence-Stale
v. Rye, 145 N.W. 2d 608 (Iowa 1966). The de-
fendant was convicted of larceny on the basis of a
confession obtained during police interrogation.
She appealed on the ground that she had not been
adequately informed of her right to counsel. The
court reversed the conviction saying that a person
under interrogation must be explicitly advised of
his right to counsel and that mere silence does not
constitute a waiver of that right.
The testimony at the trial showed that the
defendant and her companions were told that
they did not have to tell the police anything.
They were asked if they had an attorney and they
said "No". Then the defendants proceeded to
confess that they had taken certain merchandise
without paying for it.
The court held this insufficient to inform the
defendants of their rights. There was no affirma-
tive advice or warning given by the officers, no
evidence of prior knowledge by defendants of this
right and no affirmative evidence of a waiver,
unless it be taken from a silent record. As to this
last point the court said that "waiver of constitu-
tional rights cannot be presumed from a silent
record and failure to request counsel will not con-
stitute a waiver". Thus the court concluded that
to approve the procedure used by the police here
"would be to base a waiver of right to counsel on
the absence of request therefor. This [the court]
deems improper".
Comment: The Iowa court used the same reas-
oning and reached the same result as did Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was held
to be inapplicable in this case, tried in November
of 1965, since Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966), held that Miravda affects only cases tried
after June 13, 1966. However it is impossible to
tell whether or not the court would have reversed
here in the absence of its knowledge of the Su-
preme Court decision.
Defendant's "Interest In The Outcome" In-
struction Not Unconstitutional.-State v. Ford,
145 N.W. 2d. 638 (Iowa 1966). Defendant, taking
the witness stand in his own defense, was convicted
of breaking and entering with intent to commit
larceny. On appeal he objected to the instruction
which stated that in considering the defendant's
testimony, the jury is not required to receive it as
true and should consider "whether such testimony
is given by defendant in good faith or for the pur-
pose of avoiding the conviction." The appellate
court upheld the conviction and held the instruc-
tion proper.
Defendant based his contention of error on
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which
forbids comment on a defendant's failure to testify.
The Iowa court said that Griffin had no application
to this case. Nothing in the instruction "cuts down
on [defendant's] constitutional privilege" stated
the court, as does comment on failure to testify,
which makes the assertion of the fifth amendment
costly. The court relied on Reagan v. United
States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), which states that the
jury may be reminded that "interest creates a
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motive for false testimony, that the greater the
interest, the stronger is the temptation and that
the interest of the defendant ... is of a character
possessed by no other witness". The court con-
cluded that the giving of the instruction did not
amount to a denial of fair trial.
Comment: The dissent in this case pointed out
that it is normally proper to instruct the jury
that it may consider the interests, feelings, and
motives of all the witnesses in relation to their
testimony. However in this case the defendant
had been singled out. This appears to be an obvi-
ous violation of his right against self-incrimina-
tion. As the dissent states, this case gives the de-
fendant the choice of remaining silent or having
his testimony accorded singular comment by the
court. Although the Griffin case only forbids
comment upon defendant's failure to testify, it
follows logically that a defendant should not be
singled out by the court when he does testify. The
Reagan case, cited by the majority, seems to allow
this, but it is questionable whether its holding has
survived the Griffin rule.
Single Act of Solicitation Insufficient to Sustain
Vagrancy Charge as "Common Prostitute"-State
v. Custin, 419 P.2d 429 (Ore. 1966). The defendant
was convicted of vagrancy under a statute which
provided that those who are guilty of the offense
include every "common prostitute." It was stipu-
lated that the defendant on one occasion had
offered to engage in sexual intercourse for money,
but there was no evidence disclosed of previous
solicitation. The supreme court reversed the con-
viction, holding that the stipulation of the single
act of solicitation was insufficient for conviction
since use of the word 'common' in describing the
word 'prostitute' in the statute emphasizes the
fact that the statute is directed against those
women who are given to the practice of offering
themselves for promiscuous intercourse with men."
Motion Picture Obscene Long Before Written
Description of Same Acts-Landau v. Fording, 54
Cal. Rptr. 177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). The plaintiff
had been warned by the police that if he were again
to exhibit publicly a film entitled "Un Chant
d'Amour," the film would be confiscated and he
and others responsible for its showing would be
arrested for being in violation of the Penal Code,
which prohibited the showing of obscene motion
pictures. The movie was a silent, one-half hour
long presentation of homosexuality and sadism in
prison, produced early in his dramatic career by
the renowned French writer, Jean Genet. The
movie had been shown at private showings, several
art movie houses, and a university Y.M.C.A.
The plaintiff thereafter sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether the film was
obscene within the Penal Code definition -"to the
average person, applying contemporary standards,
the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a
whole, is to the prurient interest, i.e., a shameful
or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
which goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in description or representation of such
matters and is matter which is utterly without
redeeming social importance."
The trial court held that the film was obscene.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the film was nothing more than
hard-core pornography. In concluding that the
predominant appeal of the film was to the prurient
interest of the average person or the intended and
probable recipient group, the court placed special
emphasis on the media, saying that "a motion
picture of sexual scenes may transcend the bounds
of the constitutional guarantee long before a frank
description of the same scenes in the written word.
We cannot here disregard the potent visual impact
of the movie in depicting acts of male masturba-
tion, fellatio, oral copulation, voyeurism, nudity,
sadism and sodomy without any clear reference or
relation to a dominant theme."
Rule Prohibiting Admission of Evidence of
Tacit Admissions Not Retroactive-Common-
wealth v. Myers, 223 A.2d 296 (Penn. 1966). The
defendant was convicted of murder in the first
degree. An accomplice had made statements to
the police describing his and the defendant's
respective roles in the commission of the crime.
The police confronted the defendant with the
accomplice and his statement, and when asked if
he had anything to say, the defendant remained
silent. The statement and the defendant's failure
to deny its content were admitted at the trial as
evidence of a tacit admission of the truth of the
statement, over the objection of defendant's
counsel. The defendant petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, contending that the admission of
the statement and the fact of his denial was a
denial of due process, but the action was dismissed.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered whether the rule announced in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that evidence of
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the accused's failure to deny incriminating state-
ments made in his presence may not be used
against him at trial, should be retroactively applied
to the present case. In Jonsom v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966), it was held that the rule
announced in Miranda did not require retroactive
application, considering that the purpose of the
rule was to discourage courts from penalizing the
use of the privilege against self-incrimination, that
there may have been substantial reliance on prior
decisions, and that retroactive application would
substantially burden the administration of justice.
The Pennsylvania court, in concluding that there
had been reliance upon previous rulings in the
state regarding evidence of tacit admissions for
nearly a century, and that the effect of retroactive
application would be great on the administration
of justice, held that the rule would not be applied
retroactively.
One justice dissented, expressing disappoint-
ment that the Pennsylvania court had not taken
the initiative to overrule the line of cases approv-
ing the use of evidence of tacit admissions before
that result was compelled by the Supreme Court.
The dissenting justice went on to say that "the
introduction of a tacit admission so taints the trial
proceedings that it deprives the defendant of a
fair trial as a matter of federal constitutional law."
Excessive Bail and the Indigent-Hodgdon v.
United States, 365 F. 2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). The
defendant was convicted of attempting, by threats
and force, to intimidate a United States Com-
missioner and of assaulting a United States Deputy
who was endeavoring to arrest him. On appeal in
forna panperis, the defendant contended, inter
alia, that his bail, which had been set at fifty
thousand dollars, was excessive; and as a result of
not being able to obtain his release pending trial,
the defendant was not able to procure various
legal materials necessary to adequately prepare
his defense.
The Court of Appeals held that, considering
"the nature and circumstances of the offenses
charged and the character of the defendant," the
bail was not excessive. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that, since the accused was repre-
sented by competent, court-appointed counsel,
and since, at the trial, the defendant pro se "ex-
pounded sixty-five reasons why he should be
released," the defendant was not hindered in the
preparation of his defense while incarcerated.
The court noted the defendant's past history of
mental disorders and treatments, and stated that,
in the course of a psychiatric examination to deter-
mine if the accused was competent to stand trial,
it was found that the accused was a chronic schizo-
phrenic.
The opinion then reviewed the essential facts
which led to the indictment of the accused. He
had bandied about a pistol in the course of a
private interview which was held in the Com-
missioner's office. The subject of contention at this
interview was a previous ruling by the Com-
missioner, which the accused felt was in contra-
vention of the constitutional rights of the person
convicted as a result of that ruling. While the
accused was in possession of the pistol, he made
vague threats of killing the modem-day "Hes-
sians" who plagued the United States, and in
whose number the accused counted the Com-
missioner. Soon after this meeting the Commis-
sioner persuaded a friend to sign a complaint and
cause a warrant to be issued for the arrest of the
defendant. When the deputy authorized to serve
the warrant attempted to arrest the defendant in
his hotel room, the defendant shot and wounded
the deputy. The accused claimed the deputy
broke in unannounced, the deputy contended
that the accused knew the deputy to be a law
officer.
These facts, the court said, demonstrated "the
unpredictable nature" of the defendant and his
"penchant for carrying firearms." In view of this,
and since both charges against the defendant
"involved the violent use of firearms," the court
held that the bail, "although large, was not ex-
cessive."
Bail and the Recidivistic Criminal-Hansford v.
United States, 365 F. 2d 920 (1966). Defendant was
convicted of a federal narcotics violation and sen-
tenced, the trial judge "strongly recommending"
that he be assigned to the Federal Narcotics Cen-
ter at Lexington, Kentucky. On appeal, the de-
fendant contended that entrapment had been
shown as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial. However,
the court chose not to rely on the ground upon
which the defendant had premised his appeal. The
error said to demand that the court reverse and
remand was that, although a pre-trial psychiatric
examination pronounced the accused competent
to stand trial, when, in the course of the trial the
defendant's testimony indicated that he had been
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taking narcotics while out of jail on bail and
during the trial, and even during the luncheon
recess of the day the defendant gave his testi-
mony, the trial court should have inquired into
the defendant's competency.
Through lengthy review of current medical
data, the court demonstrated that "the use of
narcotics often produces a psychological and
physiological reaction, known as an acute brain
syndrome," which significantly impairs ones
memory, anxiety reaction, reasoning power and
connection with reality. During the trial a court-
appointed psychiatrist testified that he had inter-
viewed the defendant while he was out on bail,
and he had been under the influence of narcotics
and had exhibited marked symptoms of an acute
brain syndrome. Citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966), the court stated that these facts
created a "sufficient likelihood of incompetence to
impose upon the trial court a duty to inqure into
[the] appellant's competency."
Although the pre-trial psychiatric examination
finding by the St. Elizabeth's Hospital staff-that
the defendant was competent to stand trial-was
not controverted by the defendant, nor did the
defendant object to the trial court's ruling to the
same effect, the subsequent testimony that the
defendant might be under the influence of nar-
cotics, and that the defendant suffered mental
impairment while in such a state, vitiated the
finding by the St. Elizabeth's staff and the ruling
by the trial court. The appellate court stressed
that acute brain syndrome varied by degree in the
individual narcotics user, and thus an expert is
needed to adequately determine the competency
of the user.
"A retrospective determination of competency
[would be] difficult at best," said the court, and it
would be impossible in this case because the de-
fendant has been in jail for a year and "presum-
ably is no longer under the influence of narcotics.
.. " Thus, only a new trial can remedy the dep-
rivation of a fair trial which the trial court's
error caused in this case.
Circuit Judge Danaher dissented, saying, "it is
high time that the burden of establishing the
defense of insanity be placed on the accused•., he
should be required affirmatively to assert and
prove the basis upon which he seeks to be ex-
cused". And when an unchallenged determination
of competency is made, the defendant should be
held to it, but if he does successfully challenge it
the court is required to have the accused com-
mitted until he is competent to stand trial. D.C.
CODE §24-301 (1961).
By way of rebuking his fellow judges, Judge
Danaher said:
My colleagues here would transform the court
into a social laboratory, not governed by rules
of law applicable to appellate review, but by
the views of textwriters whose works may or
may not have standing in the psychiatric
profession. What are District Judges to do if
not to follow the law?
A New Approach to Bail by Federal Courts-
Vauss v. United States, 365 F. 2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Defendant, an indigent, was convicted of
purchasing and selling narcotics. Pending appeal
from this judgment, the defendant petitioned the
District Court to set bail. The District Court
denied the motion because the appeal was frivolous
and the defendant's release would constitute a
''menace to society." The defendant appealed,
contending that the appeal was not frivolous and
that the trial court's finding was an abuse of its
discretion.
The Court of Appeals held that the appeal was
not frivolous but it still affirmed the denial of the
defendant's motion to set bail pending appeal. The
appellate court agreed with the lower court's reason
for denying bail but noted that the trial judge had
not fully explored the possibility of adequate
supervision or treatment facilities which would
insure that the accused would not begin taking
narcotics again and become a danger to the com-
munity. Such an "inquiry into the availability of
alternatives to confinement is essential to proper
administration of bail and to avoid needless depri-
vation of liberty" the appellate court said, and it
is the trial court's duty to explore the available
alternatives, and counsel for both parties must
assist the court by bringing to light all possibilities.
Although the District Court made no such
investigation, the Court of Appeals, rather than
remanding the case, made its own investigation and
directed counsel to obtain a report from the
District of Columbia Bail Project regarding any
adequate supervisional facilities for narcotics ad-
dicts. Since none could be found, the District
Court's denial of the motion to set bail was
affirmed.
Comment: The bail system, as administered by
our courts today, directly contravenes the basic
aim of our judicial system, that all persons stand
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equally before the bar of justice. GOLDFARB,
RANSOm, IX (1965).
As the Hodgdon case pointed out, bail's basic
purpose is to free the accused to prepare his defense
prior to trial, yet assure society that the accused
will submit to be tried when the time comes.
Secondarily, modern judicial theory advocates that
the court utilize the bail system to protect society
from the dangerous criminal. Hodgdon v. United
States 365 F. 2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). Upon reading
the full opinion one can readily determine that the
primary factor which governed both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals when inquiring
into the bail question, was the potential danger the
defendant offered to the safety of the members of
society.
The basic issue brought to the fore by the
Hodgdon case is whether the bail process should be
used to preventively detain one accused of a crime.
When bail is set at fifty thousand dollars, and the
accused is an indigent, preventive detention is the
practical result. The bail was simply set so high
that the defendant had no hope of securing a bail
bondsman's services, to say nothing of meeting the
full amount out of his own funds. See GOLDApRB,
RANsou 12, 127-28, 131-34 (1965).
It has been held that considerations of com-
munity safety are germane when deciding whether
to deny bail, but not in setting the amount,
Hairston v. United States 343 F. 2d 313 (D.C. Cir.
1965), however, this seems not to go far enough.
Prior to trial the accused is merely that-accused.
There has been no judicial finding of his guilt. Ours
is an accusatorial system in which the state has the
burden of proving guilt, and not an inquisitorial
system where one may be deprived of his liberty
without a fair trial. If there is no process by which
preventive detention may be obtained then manip-
ulations of the bail system should not be allowed
to effectuate such detention. See United States v.
Bandy, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960).
The Supreme Court seems to agree that the
function of bail is limited to assuring the attend-
ance of the accused at the trial See Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951); but cf. FED. R. Cmr. P. 46 (c).
Implicit in this discussion is the premise that
bail prior to trial is a right, not a privilege. This
premise is based upon the policy underlying the
presumption of innocence, and the necessity of
giving the accused the utmost freedom so he may
prepare his defense. This right is conditioned upon
the defendant's giving the court a surety of enough
money to insure that he will present himself at the
trial.
It is assumed that the threat of forfeiture of
one's goods will be an effective deterrent to
the temptation to break the conditions of one's
release. But this theory is based on the as-
sumption that a defendant has property. To
continue to demand a substantial bond which
the defendant is unable to secure raises con-
siderable problems for the equal administra-
tion of the law.... It would be unconstitutional
to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant
will not gain his freedom. Yet in the case of
an indigent defendant, the fixing of bail in
even a modest amount may have the practical
effect of denying him release.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
Then irrespective of one's ability to properly
prepare his defense, setting bail at fifty thousand
dollars seems to be an unconstitutional denial of
the indigent accused's right to freedom unless the
standard ofdueprocessof law has beenmet. Italso
seems clear that such would be the holding of the
Supreme Court when one inspects the long line of
cases which demand equal rights for the indigent,
e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Griffin
v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The Hansford case is an example of how inade-
quately the bail system protects society from the
recidivistic or cyclical criminal even when ad-
ministered by a court for that purpose. As soon as
the accused could obtain his release on bail, he
began using narcotics again. The accused had a
past history of convictions for narcotics law viola-
tions and crimes generally associated with the use
of narcotics, and had received treatment at the
Lexington facilities previously. In such a case,
allowing the addict to be freed on bail was to allow
him to return to the psychological prison of
narcotics addiction. It is true that narcotics addic-
tion is an illness, and as such is not punishable by
imprisonment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S
660 (1962), but the purchase of narcotics from
illicit sellers is a violation of federal law. Ignoring
the argument that the purchase of narcotics
illegally, or related crimes, are merely symptoms
of one's illness and thus not punishable under a
Durham Rale analogy, Durham v. United States,
214 F. 2d. 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), it is a moral
certainty that an addict will commit a crime if he
is freed. Must a judge, in the proper exercise of the
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discretion that the present bail system allows him,
deny bail to the narcotics addict?
The lVauss case offers some hope for the recidi-
vistic or cyclical criminal. Release is available to
him on the condition that he be adequately treated
and supervised while out of jail. Although Vauss
was decided before the New Bail Reform Act of
1966, 80 STAT. 217, the Court of Appeals purport-
edly applied the "fundamental principles on which
it is grounded." However, the court assumed that
"detention pending appeal is justified only if the
court believes that no one or more conditions of
release will reasonably assure that the person
won't flee or pose a danger to any other person or
the community". (Emphasis added.)
In summary it can be said that bail was not
designed to be used for preventive detention. Nor
will it practically be able to effectuate this end,
since the wealthy can meet their bail, with the
help of a bondsman, no matter how high the bail.
Constitutionally, bail should not be used as a
device to achieve preventive detention. To do so is
to discriminate against poor persons, deprive one
accused of a crime of his liberty without a trial,
and accommodate an accusatorial system foreign
to our legal processes. If preventive detention is
desirable, a special proceeding should be developed
to accommodate it. The New Bail Reform Act of
1966 may be a step towards such a proceeding, but
it still allows a judge, at his discretion, to utilize
the bail system as a means of preventive detention
without guaranteeing the accused procedural due
process of law.
Right of Trial by an Impartial Jury-People v.
Hobbs, 220 N.E. 2d 469 (Ill. 1966). The defendant
was convicted of murder on a jury verdict and
sentenced to a term of 25 to 50 years. On voir dire
examination by the court the prospective jurors
were asked whether they had any religious or
conscientious convictions which would preclude
them from returning a verdict of death. 48 of the
prospective jurors answered this question affirma-
tively and were excused for cause. The defendant
appealed his conviction contending that he was
deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right
of trial by jury because those 48 prospective jurors
were disqualified.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
conviction holding that a person has a constitu-
tional right to a trial by an impartial jury-a jury
which favors neither the prosecution nor the ac-
cused. If there is bias or prejudice toward either
party, then there is ground for challenge for cause
and disqualification is warranted whenever such
bias would control a juror's judgment or interfere
with his duty to act impartially. In this case the
prospective jurors' convictions against the death
penalty might prevent a finding of guilty even
though the evidence proved the guilt of the
defendant beyond a shadow of a doubt.
Obscenity and Knowledge of the Purchaser's
Age-People v. Tannenbaum, 220 N.E. 2d 783
(N.Y. 1966). The New York State Legislature
enacted a statute (L. 1965, ch. 372, eff. July 1,
1965) prohibiting the distribution of obscene ma-
terials to infants under the age of eighteen. Under
the statute's provisions, materials which are
obscene as to infants are not necessarily obscene
as to adults. The statute does not require proof of
scienter on the part of the seller as to the age of
the purchaser.
The defendant was convicted of selling obscene
material to a seventeen year old and he appealed
contending that the statute's failure to require
proof of scienter as to the age of the purchaser
rendered the statute unconstitutional as a limita-
tion on the freedom of speech and the press.
Arguing from the present requirement of scienter
of the material's contents (without the requirement
of scienter of obscenity the bookseller may restrict
the books he sells to those he has read and there-
fore there will be a restriction upon the distribution
of constitutionally protected materials as well as
obscene materials), the defendant contended that
the failure of the statute to require knowledge
of age would also restrict the dissemination of
constitutionally protected materials because the
bookseller will not want to sell to people whose
ages he does not know and can not be sure of
knowing.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that there is a substantial
difference between permitting a conviction without
proof of knowledge of obscenity and imposing strict
liability for the sale of such material to those under
the proscribed age after proving that knowledge of
obscenity exists. There is a difference, the court
said, between requiring a bookseller to read every
book he sells and requiring him to inquire after and
establish the age of those who fall within the
doubtful age category. Any "criminal obscenity
statute applicable to booksellers will ... have
some inhibitory effect on the dissemination of
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material not obscene." Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 154-155 (1959).
Right to Adequate Assistance of Counsel-
Wilson v. Rose, 366 F. 2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966). The
state of California charged the defendant with
kidnapping, assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury, and oral copulation. These
offenses carried maximum sentences of twenty-five
years, ten years and fifteen years respectively. The
defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts and a
trial date was set.
The defendant's attorney then advised the
defendant that if he pleaded guilty to the kidnap-
ping and assault charges, he could guarantee that
the oral copulation charge would be dismissed and
that the defendant would then be placed on proba-
tion. The defendant changed his plea and pleaded
guilty to the first two counts. The oral copulation
charge was dismissed, but the state court sentenced
the defendant to the prison terms provided for the
kidnapping and assault offenses, the terms to run
concurrently.
The California statutes provide that probation
is not available to a person convicted of assault
by means likely to produce great bodily injury.
Defendant's attorney did not advise him that he
might not be placed on probation or that a guilty
plea might result in imprisonment. The attorney
could not advise him of these facts because he was
not aware of the statutory provisions and failed
to investigate those provisions. Defendant had
told his attorney that he was innocent, but his
attorney did not discuss possible defenses with
him, did not question witnesses, did not investigate
the defendant's story and made no effort to
investigate the factual circumstances of the case or
the applicable law.
The district court, ruling on defendant's habeas
corpus petition, held that the defendant's attorney
totally failed to present the cause of the defendant
in any fundamental respect and therefore the de-
fendant was not accorded "due process of law" in
the trial court. The district court set aside the de-
fendant's conviction and the state appealed.
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Court
of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to
the assistance of counsel in determining his plea
and that this sixth amendment guarantee is made
mandatory upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment. Just- as right to the assistance of
counsel is essential to a fair trial, so, too, is effeclive
assistance of counsel essential to a fair trial. There
is no difference between ineffective counsel and no
counsel at all. The defendant was entitled to
reasonably adequate professional aid, but his at-
torney fell below the minimum standard of profes-
sional service when he advised defendant to plead
guilty on the ground that probation was guar-
anteed without any assurances that it was guaran-
teed, without checking whether the statute pro-
vision may have prevented probation, without any
effort to determine what sentence might be forth-
coming if probation was denied, and without
any inquiry into the merits of defendant's asser-
tion of innocence. "Prior to trial an accused is
entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an
independent examination of the facts, circum-
stances, pleadings and laws involved and then to
offer his informed opinion as to what plea should
be entered." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,
721 (1948) (Emphasis added.)
Warrantless Searches and Seizures Upheld-
People v. Moore, 220 N.E. 2d 443 (Ill. 1966). The
defendants were convicted of armed robbery.
Defendant Barbee had fired two shots at a passing
police car. When the officer gave chase, defendant
Moore jumped from the car in front of which
Barbee was standing. The officer's chase proved
unsuccessful and he returned to the parked car
where another officer joined him. They searched
the parked car and found a loaded sawed-off
shotgun in the back seat. The car was kept under
surveillance for about four hours until the defend-
ants returned to it and were arrested. The de-
fendants contended that the search was invalid
since it was conducted without a search warrant
and was not incident to a lawful arrest. They relied
upon Preston v. United Stales, 376 U.S. 364 (1964),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held invalid the search of an automobile occurring
at a later time than and at a place removed from,
the arrest of the occupants.
In affirming the conviction the Supreme Court
of Illinois emphasized the fact that the fourth
amendment of the federal constitution is concerned
with unreasonable searches and seizures and that
the reasonableness of the officer's conduct cannot
be narrowly limited "by the chance boundaries of
decided cases." Each case must be judged accord-
ing to its own peculiar circumstances. Although
hindsight now showed that the officers had ample
time to obtain a search warrant before the defend-
ants returned to their car, at the time of the search
the officers had no way of knowing when the
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defendants would return. Similarly, the officers had
no way of knowing if the defendants had any
weapons in the car with which they could attempt
an escape from arrest. The officers made a reason-
able assumption that the explanation for the shots
might be found in the automobile. It was the
officers' duty to determine the cause of the shooting
and to apprehend the men who fired the shots.
The failure of the officers to search the car im-
mediately might have subjected them to discipline
from their superiors, and when "a police officer
could justifiably be disciplined for failure to act,"
the court said, "his action can hardly be charac-
terized as unreasonable."
In a companion case, People v. Barbee, 220 N.E.
2d 401 (Ill. 1966), the evidence showed that the
same search of the parked car revealed a registra-
tion slip showing that the automobile belonged to
the defendant along with two gas receipts signed
by the defendant. The officer and four other
members of the police department went to the
defendant's home. They noticed a car parked in
the driveway and, upon checking with the station
house, found that it belonged to a convicted bank
robber. The officers rang the doorbell and the
defendant's wife answered the door. The officers
identified themselves and asked if the defendant
was at home. The answer was no. They requested
permission to search the house, but this request
was refused.
A few officers stationed themselves outside the
house while the others appeared before a magis-
trate and obtained a search warrant. (This warrant
was executed without having a signed affidavit by
the complaining officer and therefore it was
invalid.) The officers returned to the defendant's
house and searched it. Not finding the defendant
in the house, the officers proceeded to search the
garage where they found a car hidden under a
tarpaulin. Thinking that the defendant might be
hiding in the car they lifted the tarpaulin off, but
found the car empty. A check with the station
house revealed that this car was a stolen one and it
was for the theft of this automobile that the
defendant was convicted.
At the trial the defendant moved to suppress
evidence concerning the stolen automobile which
was seized under an invalid search warrant. The
trial court denied this motion and the defendant
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the con-
viction agreeing with the trial court that the
conduct of the officers was reasonable and did not
violate the fourth amendment of the federal
constitution. The court held that the officers were
lawfully present in the garage because they reason-
ably believed that they were in close pursuit of an
armed man "who had committed a violent offense
of a particularly flagrant type." The "practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement" required that the defendant be
apprehended. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960). The officers did not have to over-
look the stolen car which they discovered under
the tarpaulin in their search for the defendant.
"Here it would be without reason to say that an
officer must overlook or return an article subject
to lawful seizure because it was not one of the
things it was his business to look for."
Double Jeopardy and Inter-County Traffic Of-
fenses-Huff v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W. 2d 831
(Ky. 1966). Defendant, while driving without a
license, was being chased by Officer Grossman at a
high rate of speed in Bullitt County. During the
chase Officer Grossman had an accident, and gave
up pursuit. He had radioed ahead, however, and
when the defendant entered Nelson County, he was
chased and finally arrested by Officer Feltner. He
received two citations from each officer, for reck-
less driving, and driving on a suspended license.
He payed the fines in Bullitt County, but refused
to pay the fines given in Nelson County, claiming
that the doctrine of former jeopardy applied since
he had already been convicted for the offenses in
Bullitt County.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld this
claim, ruling that the acts "constituted a con-
tinuous offense, and the fact that part of his
conduct occurred in one county and part in another
does not give jurisdiction to both counties." The
defendant had been operating his motor vehicle
at a high rate of speed for about six miles, and this
was a continuous act, said the court, which could
not be split into separate offenses "so as to justify
the imposition of two penalties in each county."
The court went on to say that the decision might
have been different if the defendant had travelled
for a substantial distance in each county "with
opportunity to slow down or vary his speed."
Bail Must Be Set For Each Defendant In-
dividually-State v. Toomey, 223 A. 2d 473 (Vt,
1966). The defendant was arrested and charged
with robbery, kidnapping, and burglary. The trial
court, at the prosecutor's suggestion set the bail
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at $22,500. The defendant appealed on the grounds
that the bail was excessive.
The trial court had based its determination of
the bail on two factors both of which the Supreme
Court of Vermont held to be abuses of discretion
as being clearly untenable and unreasonable.
The first ground stated by the trial court was
that the defendant was a non-resident while the
victim of the alleged crime was a resident. The
appellate court held that while the residence of
the defendant was a relevant factor that of the
victim was not. The second ground stated by the
trial court was that it had set similiar bail for others
charged with the same offense. The appellate court
held that "in criminal proceedings against more
than one defendant the standards for fixing bail are
to be applied to each defendant individually."
The court also held that the proper factors are
the following: "(1) ability of the accused to give
bail, (2) nature of the offense, (3) penalty for the
offense charged, (4) character and reputation of
the accused, (5) health of the accused, (6) charac-
ter and strength of the evidence, (7) probability
of the accused appearing at the trial, (8) forfeiture
of other bonds, and (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested."
Limit of Two Attorneys Per Indigent-McLaugh-
lin v. State, 145 N.W. 2d 153 (Wis. 1966). The
defendant had pleaded guilty to a consolidated
charge of abducting and murdering a six year old
boy and was sentenced to jail. About six months
later, the defendant applied to the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin for appointment of counsel to
prosecute a writ of error. That court appointed an
attorney who subsequently submitted a compre-
hensive report stating that there were no grounds
for an appeal. On the request of the defendant,
another attorney was appointed who also sub-
mitted a report reaching the same conclusion. The
defendant then appealed pro se to the court for
the appointment of a third attorney.
The Wisconsin court noted that Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), only required that
counsel be appointed to prepare a first appeal. The
court felt that the Wisconsin procedure of appoint-
ment of two attorneys was sufficient to meet the
Douglas requirements although "no procedure,
short of the continuous appointment of attorneys
until the entire list is exhausted, can ever literally
provide every poor man with counsel that may be
available to the rich."
Comment: The appointment and discharge of
one attorney has been held sufficient in Connecti-
cut, Fredricks v. Reincke 208 A.2d 756 (1965), and
California, In re Nash 393 P.2d 405, (1964).
Insanity Defense Permitted In Juvenile Pro-
ceeding-Winburn v. State 145 N.W. 2d 178, (Wis.
1966). Winburn, a minor, had shot and killed his
mother. A petition to have him declared a delin-
quent was filed by the state of Wisconsin. At the
hearing Winburn's guardian ad litem, an attorney,
contended that Winburn was presently insane and
was insane at the time of the shooting. The
juvenile court ordered a pyschiatric examination to
be conducted. Two psychiatrists examined Win-
burn and found him to be insane both at the time
of the shooting and presently. The juvenile court
thereupon dismissed the delinquency petition and
ordered Winburn committed. The circuit court
reversed and Winburn appealed to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
The state contended that "a juvenile-delin-
quency procedure is not a criminal prosecution,
but is merely the state's exercise of its duties parens
patriae over children ... and accordingly, the
armor of 'rights' that can be donned by a defendant
in a criminal case is not available to the alleged
delinquent."
The appellate court conceded the fact that
delinquency procedures are not criminal prosecu-
tions and that many procedures and standards
applicable in adult cases are inapplicable to
juvenile trials. However, the Wisconsin court
looked to the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Kent v. United States 383 U.S.
541, (1966), to find that "the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment." (Emphases added.) The court noted some
of the effects that a delinquency finding could have,
e.g., availability of record to future employers,
particularly the federal government; stigma at-
tached by society; and the possibility of ultimately
being sent to an adult prison.
Based on the Kent language and their own
observations, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that a juvenile delinquency hearing, while not
criminal in nature, has similiar results and there-
fore similiar procedures should be afforded,
particularly that of an insanity defense. The court
said "It is therefore apparent that the state's
argument that the 'old concept of criminal respon-
sibility' has no relevance is not completely accept-
able if we are to accord to children ... the
'essentials of due process and fair treatment'."
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Furthermore, the court held that intent has been
a factor in a juvenile delinquency determination
since 1921 and therefore "a petition based on a
violation that requires criminal intent cannot result
in a finding of delinquency when the conduct was
either unintended or when because of insanity there
was a failure to form the requisite intent."
Trace of Narcotics Insufficient for Conviction-
People v. Thomas, 54 Cal. Reptr. 409, (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966). Defendant was convicted of possession
of narcotics. A narcotics officer named Walley had
entered an apartment belonging to one Owings in
which the defendant was also present for the
purpose of buying narcotics. Walley negotiated
with Owings (the defendant did not take part),
purchased a pound of marijuana, and subsequently
arrested Owings, while another officer arrested the
defendant. The defendant was taken to the police
station and about one hour later was searched. In
the course of the search an officer turned the
defendant's pocket inside out and nine fragments
of marijuana fell out. The defendant first admitted,
then denied, that the shirt was his. The trial court
sitting without a jury convicted him.
The appellate court considered the issue of
whether the search was valid and found that it was.
It held that the defendant had been validly
arrested and that the subsequent delay did not
render the search at the jail invalid. The court said
that "the search at the jail was entirely proper not
only for the purpose of acquiring any obvious
evidence ... but also to insure the safety of
prisoners and jail personnel after his incarcera-
tion."
The court felt that the major issue, and the one
which necessitated a reversal of the conviction, was
the quantity of narcotics found on the defendant.
The court referred to previous cases which had
sustained narcotics convictions where only a
minute quantity of drugs were found, but held that
the recent cases of People v. Leal, 50 Cal. Rptr.
777 (1966), and People v. McCarthy 50 Cal. Rptr.
783 (1966), governed. These cases held that the
crime of illegal possession does "not contemplate
that convictions should be obtained from the sole
proof of possession of minute quantities of the
forbidden drug; to justify convictions the narcotic
should be in quantities large enough to be the subject
of sale or of use by the possessor or others." (Empha-
sis added.)
Right to Court-appointed Counsel on Appeal
Applies Retrospectively-Donnell v. Swenson, 258
F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Mo. 1966). Petitioner's pro se
motion for appointment of appellate counsel was
filed in December, 1960, and denied by the
Supreme Court of Missouri. In this proceeding for
federal habeas corpus, he urged that the Supreme
Court decision in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), should be applied retrospectively to
the denial, which he alleged violated his sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights.
Recognizing that the principle of Douglas was
"almost universally applied retrospectively" the
District Court felt that retrospective application
had to be considered in light of more recent
Supreme Court decisions-Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965), and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966). "So far as we know, this is the
first case in which it must be considered whether
the rationale of Linkletter ... and Johnson requires
that the principle of Douglas not be applied
retrospectively."
Linkletter was cited for the proposition that in
cases where retrospective status is questioned,
judges are "to weigh the merits and demerits in
each case by looking to the prior history of the rule
in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation." Johnson added that retroactivity must
always be considered in light of its impact on the
administration of justice.
Applying these guidelines, the court held that
Douglas was to be applied retrospectively. Con-
sidering the "purpose and effect" of the right to
counsel, the court concluded that "we cannot
escape either the logic or the experience of the
proposition that the purpose of having a lawyer
on appeal and the purpose of having a lawyer at
the time of trial are the same." Douglas was held
to be within that class of cases whose function is to
assure the determination of truth, the protection of
the innocent from conviction, and the preservation
of the fact-finding process. "Logic dictates that
Douglas belongs with Gideon, Griffin... and the
other cases which are cited ... as having absolute
retospective application," in contrast to the Esco-
bedo and Miranda decisions, "which are to be
applied only prospectively."
Furthermore, the court could not see any
disruption of the administration of justice in
Missouri, should Douglas be applied retrospec-
tively.
Copies Made of Stolen Documents Considered
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as Originals for Purposes of Federal Statute-
United States v. Bottone, 365 F. 2d. 389 (2nd Cir.
1966). Appellants were convicted of the transporta-
tion of various documents and papers across state
lines for the purpose of sale to foreign buyers. They
were indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2314 for transport-
ing in interstate commerce "any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities, or money... knowing the
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by
fraud." They contended that the documents (which
contained trade secrets and formulas belonging to
Lederle Laboratories) were not "goods" which had
been "stolen, converted or taken by fraud,"
because all the papers removed from Lederle Labs
were taken to another location within the state,
copied on film or in notes, with the originals then
returned to the Lederle files. Thus only the copies
were ever moved in interstate commerce.
Affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected this
argument. While the definition of "goods" within
the meaning of Sec. 2314 would not apply to
documents which were "memorized" and carried
away across state lines "in the recesses of a thievish
mind", the court said, where the "only obstacle to
condemnation is a clever intermediate transcrip-
tion or use of a photocopy machine," and where
the "physical form of the stolen goods is secondary
in every respect to the matter recorded in them,"
the fact that they are transferred into a tangible
object never possessed by the owner is "imma-
terial".
Right to Counsel for a Misdemeanor Committed
During Prison Term-Creighton v. North Carolina,
257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D., N.C. 1966). Petitioner was
convicted of unlawful entry. While serving a
two-year sentence for that crime, he escaped. He
was tried and sentenced to an additional six
month's imprisonment, and was also tried and
convicted of an "Attempt to Commit a Felony"
during the escape. For the latter he received a
twelve month sentence, to be served concurrently
with the escape sentence. He was not represented
by counsel at either of these misdemeanor trials.
This fact constituted the basis for his filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The District Court recognized that the right to
counsel could be construed as extending even to
misdemeanors and minor traffic violations, but
reasoned that practical considerations should be
taken into account. The need for counsel must be
measured by the "nature of the charge and the
ability of the average man to face it alone, unaided
by an expert in the law." The right to counsel is
not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve
the most perfect justice possible.
The District Court also stated that because there
are exceptions even to "absolute rights", there will
be occasions when counsel need not be provided.
However, where a misdemeanor involves punish-
ment which would result in "substantial depriva-
tion of liberty [or property] ... counsel should be
appointed." Each case should be left "to the
discretion of the trial judge," considering the
"nature of the charge [which would include the
possible penalty] and the ability of the average
man to face it without the aid of counsel ...."
Credit Cards Not "Securities"-Unied States v.
Barnett, 258 F. Supp. 455 (M.D., Tenn. 1965).
Defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of 18
U.S.C. §2314 which makes unlawful the interstate
transportation of any "tool, implement or thing"
used in "falsely making, forging... or counter-
feiting any security.... ." He had been charged
with the transportation in interstate commerce of
a stolen Diner's Club credit card, described in the
information as a "thing fitted to be used in falsely
making and forging evidences of indebtedness."
Recognizing an "even split" in the decisions on
the question whether credit card sales slips are
"securities" within §2314, the District Court con-
cluded that there has to be some allegation to bring
the credit card receipt within the definition of a
"security", and that "as a matter of law, the
unauthorized use of credit cards is not an offense
against the United States under 18 U.S.C.A. Sec.
2314." Mere allegation that a stolen credit card
has been transported in interstate commerce does
not state an offense. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the District Court in United States v. Fordyce,
192 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal., 1961) also decided, on
the merits, that a Diner's Club Card sales slip is
not a security. Defendant's motion to vacate
judgment was therefore granted.
Marijuana Seeds Are Not Marijuana-State v.
Haddock, 418 P.2d. 577 (Ariz. 1966) Defendant was
charged with illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of a state statute. He moved to quash the
information on the ground that his possession of
approximately 100 marijuana seeds was not a
crime. On certification, the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that the statutory term as commonly
used referred to the "product which is used for
smoking." "Since the seeds are not and do not
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contain the narcotic product and cannot be used in
the customary manner to obtain a narcotic effect,
we are of the opinion that the legislature did not
intend to make possession of marijuana seeds a
crime."
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. S.D., Cal. 1966).
Plaintiff was a prison inmate at the Correctional
Training Facility at Soledad, California. He
brought a civil rights action in the District Court,
seeking both injunctive and monetary relief, under
claims of unconstitutional subjection to cruel and
unusual punishment.
The punishment consisted of incarceration in one
of Soledad's "strip cells" on numerous occasions,
and in particular from July 9, 1965, to July 20,
1965. The cells were alleged to be too small, poorly
heated, poorly lighted and without adequate
ventilation. During incarceration in such cells,
food and medical treatment were grossly inade-
quate, sleeping conditions were shocking, there
were no provisions for personal hygiene and waste
disposal was non-existent. The cells were filthy,
foul-smelling and in the court's words "stench and
filth" surrounded the prisoner.
This was the first occasion that the court had
undertaken "to inquire into the procedures and
practices of a State penal institution in a proceed-
ing of this kind." Injunctive relief was granted, but
monetary relief was denied.
Recognizing that administrative responsibility
usually rests with the prison officials, without
judicial interference, the court held that it must
intervene where those authorities have "abandoned
elemental concepts of decency by permitting con-
ditions to prevail of a shocking and debased
nature!" Testimony before the court confirmed the
allegations of the complaint. "Requiring man or
beast to live, eat and sleep under the degrading
conditions pointed out in the testimony creates a
condition that inevitably does violence to elemental
concepts of decency."
Noting that certain changes had since taken
place, the court did not prescribe what should be
provided for the prisoners, except to say that
"whether a man is confined in a strip cell, or in
solitary confinement, he is entitled to receive the
essentials for survival. The essentials for survival
necessarily include the elements of water and food
and requirements for basic sanitation." The court
also cited the maintenance standards set out in the
prison manuals, stating that if they were adopted
and followed, they would "meet the minimum
standards of the Eighth Amendment."
Comment: The opinion does not indicate why
the plaintiff was placed in the strip cells, though
there was testimony as to the general punitive
reasons for such incarceration. Would the condi-
tions have constituted "shocking" punishment if
plaintiff's prison offenses were grievous ones?
Arbitrary Punishment Within Prison Confines-
Howard v. Smyth, 365 F. 2d. 428 (4th Cir. 1966).
Petitioner, a practicing Black Muslim, properly
requested that the prison provide opportunities for
the Muslim inmates to worship according to their
beliefs. The Superintendent of the prison demanded
that petitioner reveal the names of the prisoners
for whom he spoke. He refused, fearing that "some
sort of disciplinary action would be visited upon
them." For this refusal, he was summarily placed
in the maximum security ward for an indeter-
minate term, where he remained for four years. He
was not guilty of any breach of discipline. The
action was taken on the ground that the Superin-
tendent "wished to prevent any trouble in the form
of riots or escape." The District Court denied
release from maximum security, and on appeal,
the judgment was reversed and remanded.
The Court of Appeals rejected the prison
officials' argument that maximum security was
only "segregation" and not "punishment". The
deprivations suffered in the security ward "cannot
be treated as insubstantial", the court said. Highly
significant was the fact that those so confined were
not considered eligible for parole. The court rea-
soned that while officials may exercise legitimate
authority to prevent breaches of discipline, they
may not arbitrarily punish under circumstances
like those involved here. "A prisoner is not bereft
of all his rights. Included among those retained is
an immunity from punishment for making a
reasonable attempt to exercise his religion, even a
religion that to some of us may seem strangely
confused and irrational."
Comment: Although the Court proceeded on the
assumption that petitioner was placed in maximum
security for no reason other than his refusal to
disclose the names of the other Black Muslims,
their designation of the Muslim religion as "con-
fused and irrational" would indicate the real
"probable cause" of the incarceration. The court
avoids the question whether the Muslim "religion"
includes beliefs and courses of action inherently
incompatible with prison order and security. The
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Superintendent apparently felt this to be the case,
but apparently this defense was not raised.
Obscenity and Motion Picture Classification-
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City oJ Dallas, 366 F. 2d
590 (5th Cir. 1966). The City of Dallas passed an
ordinance which required motion pictures to be
classified as suitable or unsuitable for persons under
the age of sixteen. The statute defines "not suitable
for young persons" as
"(1) Describing or portraying brutality, crim-
inal violence or depravity in such manner
as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely
to incite or encourage crime or delinquency on
the part of young persons; or
(2) Describing or portraying nudity beyond
the customary limits of candor in the com-
munity, or sexual promiscuity or extramarital
or abnormal sexual relations in such manner
as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely
to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual
promiscuity on the part of young persons or
to appeal to their prurient interest."
A group of Dallas motion picture exhibitors filed
a complaint in the United States District Court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance
was unconstitutional in whole or in part. The
District Court found that the city had the power
to pass such an ordinance and that this ordinance
was valid. The motion picture exhibitors appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment in part and reversed it in part.
The appellate court held that obscenity can be
measured by its appeal to the prurient interest of
the intended and probable recipient group. The
court concluded from its study of Supreme Court
decisions that the Court favored a variable
obscenity approach as contrasted to a constant
obscenity approach. The concept of constant
obscenity assumes that obscenity is an inherent
quality of material that renders it unfit for every-
one in all circumstances. This concept is rejected
by a variable obscenity approach which determines
obscenity by its appeal to and its effect upon the
audience to which the material is primarily di-
rected. Thus a film can be obscene as to children
and not obscene as to adults. The court held that
the Dallas ordinance regulated obscene material as
to children, but did not have the effect of reducing
adults to a level of consumption fit for children.
The ordinance protects children from motion
pictures which are obscene as to them without
unduly or appreciably restricting adults.
The court then faced the more difficult question
of whether a classification standard could go
beyond restriction of obscenity, by seeking also to
regulate the showing of movies which depicted
excessive brutality and criminal violence. The
court held that although obscenity is not protected
by the first amendment, other forms of speech and
expression which are not obscene (such as bru-
tality) do all under the protection of the amend-
ment. The court looked to the actions of the censors
and to the long history of misuse of censorship
power and concluded that the standard for classifi-
cation must be restricted to the control of ob-
scenity only. The court recognized "the interest of
society in protecting children", but they held that
"even the child's freedom of speech [is] too precious
to be subjected to the whim of the censor."
Jury List Selection Systems and the Negro-
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir.
1966). The defendant was indicted, tried and
convicted of perjury for her testimony before a
grand jury regarding a civil rights picketing
incident. On appeal, the defendant contended, inter
alia, that the trial court committed prejudicial
error when it denied motions to dismiss the indict-
ment and quash the petit jury panel because the
method used to compile the jury lists violated the
federal statutory scheme and did not represent a
fair cross section of the community. The Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the
indictment, holding that the Jury Commissioner
and the Court Clerk had violated the federal
statutory scheme when they compiled the jury
lists.
The Commissioner and the Clerk who drew up
the jury lists wished to place on the lists only
persons of good moral character and intelligence
adequate to understand complex cases. To effec-
tuate this purpose, they placed personal acquaint-
ances they knew possessed such attributes on the
lists and asked these persons to recommend others
who could also meet these standards. This system
of selecting potential jurors was characterized by
the court as the "key man" system.
Although the court stated that those drawing
up the jury lists were guilty of no inala ides, their
system of selection had allowed only a small
number of Negroes to be placed on the lists. At the
time the defendant was indicted and tried, only
5.8% of the persons on the lists were Negroes
although Negroes made up 34.5 % of the population
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of the district from which the potential jurors were
chosen.
The court agreed those on the list were qualified,
but noted that the system of selection excluded
many who were also qualified. Quoting from Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940), the court said,
"Tendencies, no matter how slight, towards the
selection of jurors by any method other than a
process which will insure a trial by a representative
group are undermining processes weakening the
institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily
resisted."
The court then reviewed various revisions of the
Judicial Code, beginning in 1948 and culminating
in 1957, which, it said, took away from federal and
state officials the wide discretion they had had in
evolving and applying jury qualifications, and set
out a uniform set of qualifications for federal jurors.
By an exhaustive investigation of legislative
history, the court demonstrated that these qualifi-
cations were not minimum standards, but uniform
norms which the jury commissioners were required
to apply, thus they were not able to apply stand-
ards which were more strict than those set out at
law. Only a district judge can excuse a juror
qualified at law.
The government contended that, since the grand
jury that indicted the defendant counted five
Negroes among its number, the indictment should
stand. The court disagreed holding that the right
to serve on a federal jury is a new civil right, and
the injury in this case was an injury to the jury
system, to the community, and to democracy.
"When the basic jury list was poisoned," the court
said, "the fruits of that list were also infected. To
cure the infection, it is necessary to start the
process anew."
Circuit Judge Brown concurred, but felt that the
standards enumerated in the judicial Code were
not exclusive. "The jury must be a fair cross section
of the community, and to assure this, the jury
selectors must acquaint themselves with the iden-
tity and availability of potentially qualified persons
within significant elements of that community."
Circuit Judge Bell, dissenting in part, thought
that the law allows "such care in selection to the
end that more competent citizens are selected for
the jury list if the end result is a fair cross section
of the community," and the 1957 amendment to
the jury competency statute did not depart from
"this common sense dictate." He further disagreed
with the majority opinion's test, racial propor-
tions, to see if the list did represent a fair cross
section. He felt race plus literacy should be the test
since the law requires jurors to be literate. 28
U.S.C. 1861 (2) (1957).
In a review of the legislative history of the 1957
amendment [reflected in 28 U.S.C. 1861-64 (1957)],
Judge Bell concluded that jury commissions may
exercise discretion in selection as long as the jury
fairly represents the community, and may try to
obtain potential jurors of the highest degree of
intelligence. Of those over 25 years of age, only
15.7% of the Negro population of the district had
finished grade school, so the fact that the list
contained 5.8% Negroes did not reflect a non-
representative jury list under a constitutional test,
but the selection system's "operation went wrong
to the extent that the result is cast in considerable
doubt." Thus Judge Bell concludes the conviction
should have been reversed, but the indictment
should have been upheld since there were five
Negroes on the grand jury, and dismissal of the
indictment in such a situation "is not equal
protection."
Circuit Judge Gewin, who concurred with Judge
Bell, said there was no constitution infirmity in
this case, but merely a violation of the statute,
which "proscribes discrimination directly or in-
directly in the jury selection process." Chance v.
United States, 322 F. 2d 201, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
823 (1963). Thus he would uphold the indictment
because five Negroes sat on the grand jury.
Circuit Judge Coleman concurred with the
reversal because the government requested it.
However, he dissented from the dismissal of
indictments. Intelligent jurors are needed to com-
prehend fact issues and to resolve them, and
Congress cannot devise standards which would
allow persons who cannot perform this function to
sit on a federal jury; if Congress did so it would
violate the constitution.
In summary Judge Coleman said, "when any
party litigant has been heard by a fair, impartial
and intelligent jury, he should have no further
room to complain."
Postponement of Trial Because of Temporary
Amnesia-State v. McClendon, 419 P. 2d 69 (Ariz.
1966). The defendant was convicted of second
degree murder. Three days before trial, counsel for
defendant filed a motion to postpone trial and
commit the defendant to an institution because he
was suffering from amnesia and could not properly
assist counsel in his own defense. This motion was
denied by the trial court because "it would serve
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no useful purpose to grant a continuance because
of the unlikeliness of defendant ever completely
recovering his memory."
The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the
testimony of a psychiatrist after a one hour exam-
ination of the defendant evinced a lack of certainty
as to whether the amnesia was temporary or
permanent, and that therefore a continuance
should have been granted to allow for a concrete
determination. The court distinguished between
amnesia of a permanent type from a temporary
condition which could be cured with proper treat-
ment. It said that in a case of permanent amnesia
no useful purpose could be served by a postpone-
ment, and such a motion should be denied.
The court then went on to say that "It is our
belief it would be a reproach to justice if a man,
while suffering from a temporary amnesic condition
which could be alleviated by a reasonable amount
of treatment, was compelled to go to trial at a
time when he was not sufficiently in possession of
his memory to enable him to properly assist his
counsel." As to cases in which it is not clear
whether the amnesia is temporary or permanent,
the court said it would be equally unfair to compel
the man to go to trial "when the possibility
existed that a further examination would reveal
his condition to be temporary and susceptible to
treatment."
The court concluded that the motion should have
been granted, and added that the possibility that
granting such a continuance would "result in a
person escaping punishment for a little while
longer and impose upon the State an added expense
ought not to deprive the defendant of a fair and
just trial."
Entering a Public Phone Booth with Intent to
Commit a Felony Considered Burglary-State v.
Keys, 419 P. 2d 943 (Ore. 1966). Defendant, along
with others, entered public telephone booths
broke open the coin boxes attached to the tele-
phones, and removed the money from them. They
were subsequently arrested and convicted of
violating a state statute defining the crime of
burglary as the breaking and entering of a build-
ing, booth etc. with intent to steal or commit any
felony therein. Another statute states that "break-
ing and entering" is every unlawful entry of any
building, booth, etc. with intent to steal or commit
a felony therein.
Defendant's appeal was based on the contention
that since the telephone booths which he broke
into were open to the public there was no unlawful
entry as required to constitute the crime of bur-
glary. The court however, rejected this argument.
It said that, although the common law crime of
burglary required an actual physical breaking of
the structure except where entry was obtained by
fraud, threats, trickery, artifice or pretense, the
statute significantly enlarged the scope of the
crime. While an unlimited invitation to enter still
does not constitute breaking and entering, where
the invitation is limited to lawful purposes and the
defendant enters for the purpose of committing a
felony there has been an unlawful entry.
There was a strong dissent by three justices who
alleged that the majority's definition of unlawful
entry, "makes virtually every crime committed
indoors a burglary if the intent to commit the
crime was formed before the offender entered the
building." The dissent felt that "unlawful" should
be limited to wrongful means in gaining entry.
The Defense of Entrapment-Stae v. LeBruo,
419 P. 2d 948 (Ore. 1966). Defendant was intro-
duced by a friend of his (a police informer) to a
police officer who was pretending to be an addict
in need of some narcotics. Defendant told him
about a ready supply; offered to sell him some, and
the offer was accepted. When defendant appeared
the next morning with a handbag full of morphine,
he was arrested. It was alleged that the police
officer had no knowledge of defendant's criminal
record. Defendant was convicted of possession of
narcotics.
His sole defense at trial was entrapment on
which the jury was instructed. Defendant's re-
quested instruction, however, stating that if
criminal intent to do the act did not originate
with defendant and the accused was not a rea-
sonably suspected person, then defendant could
not be convicted because of entrapment, was not
given, and because of this he assigned error.
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the
conviction, holding that there are two elements
essential to a defense of entrapment: (1) that the
police induced the accused to commit the offense
charged in the indictment; and (2) that the accused
was not willing to commit the offense, and would
not have, absent persuasion by the police. Fur-
thermore, previous cases, although discussing
"reasonable cause" to suspect defendant, use it
"'as evidentiary of an already existing criminal
intent upon the part of the accused rather than an
absolute prerequisite to the police practice here
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involved. .. .' United States v. Abdallah, 149 F. 2d
219 (2d Cir.)."
Confessions Obtained During Period of Inter-
rogation When No Counsel was Requested-State
v. Hamilton, 419 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1966). Defendant
was arrested and subsequently convicted of rob-
bery on the basis of a confession voluntarily given
by him during a conversation with the police.
Prior to such confession, the arresting officers had
informed defendant of his right to counsel, of his
right to remain silent, and of the fact that anything
he might say could be used against him. Defendant
then stated that he was going to make arrange-
ments to get an attorney, but made no indication
that he desired counsel at that time. In the discus-
sion which ensued he voluntarily confessed to the
crime.
Defendant sought reversal of his conviction
alleging that he had been denied the right to
counsel, relying specifically on Escobedo v. Illinois
378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). Apparently, his theory was that
in stating that he would seek the advice of a
lawyer, defendant did not by some kind of nega-
tive implication waive his constitutional right to
counsel prior to the time that he retained an
attorney. The court, in upholding the conviction,
held that this constitutional protection of the
defendant cannot be looked at as an isolated or
theoretical abstraction, but can only be considered
in light of the purpose which it was intended to
serve, i.e. the protection of an accused from certain
abuses which would be prevented by the presence
of an attorney.
Here, the court felt there was no indication of
abuse since there was nothing in the record to
suggest any likelihood of force or harshness. Fur-
thermore, even though the defendant indicated an
intention to obtain a lawyer, he did not state
that he wanted one at that time. In fact, he pro-
ceeded with the conversation knowing he did not
have the protection of counsel. Finally, the court,
in weighing the interests of government in seeing
that the guilty are brought to justice against the
rights of the accused, found that in this case the
former clearly outweighed the latter.
Right to Counsel During Interrogation-Unted
States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1966).
Defendant was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina of the murder of one Cortney Reed on
the military reservation of Fort Bragg and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. On appeal defendant
contended in part that where his expressed desire
for counsel was followed by the taking, at the
instance of F.B.I. agents, of incriminatory state-
ments, preceded by a recitation of defendant's
formal rights, which occurred after expression of
defendant's desire for counsel but before counsel
had been obtained, defendant was denied his right
to counsel, and admission of such testimony was
reversible error.
Defendant was arrested in May of 1962, for a
violation of the Dyer Act when he attempted to
sell the car of the deceased. He was questioned by
F.B.I. agents, after the warning that he had the
right to counsel and the right to remain silent, for
a few hours at which time appellant denied that
he stole the car and further denied any knowledge
of the death of Reed. He insisted instead that he
had bought the car from Reed for $300 paid in
three installments-the last of which was made
the day of the murder. The appellant then indi-
cated that he did not wish to say anything more
about the matter. He was taken before the United
States Commissioner in New York City for ar-
raignment under the Dyer Act.
The commissioner at this time asked the defend-
ant if he wished to have a lawyer represent him.
The defendant replied that he either had an attor-
ney or knew of one who would represent him. The
hearing was then adjourned until a later date to
allow appellant to obtain counsel. Bail was set at
$25,000 apparently because of defendant's com-
plicity in the murder. Counsel was finally ap-
pointed for defendant when he could obtain none
and he was tried and acquitted of the Dyer Act
charge in September of 1962. He was not indicted
in the present case until September of 1963.
The statements in question that defendant
claimed were wrongly admitted at trial were
those taken during questioning after the stay in
the arraignment proceedings to allow defendant
to obtain the counsel he requested. On the day
following the adjournment F.B.I. agents, after
once again warning him of his rights to remain
silent and have counsel, questioned him further
about his dealings with the deceased. During this
questioning defendant continued to claim his
innocence, but in making exculpatory statements
three times contradicted himself as to deceased's
signature on the certificate of transfer. He first
claimed that deceased had executed the instru-
ment but then admitted that deceased had only
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indicated how it was to be filled out and that in
fact his wife had forged the signature of deceased
Defendant made no confession of guilt to either
charge and signed no statements. The contradic-
tory statements, however, were used against him
in the trial for murder.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of
murder, holding inter alia, that the admission of
such evidence was unconstitutional under the
Escobedo decision. They acknowledged the fact
that Miranda was not applicable because of the
question of retroactivity decided in Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), but held in
essence that Escobedo was as explicit as Miranda
with regard to this question. In the latter case the
Supreme Court held that all questioning must
stop after a defendant makes a request for counsel,
and that if it is once again resumed the burden is
heavy on the government to prove an express
waiver by the defendant of his right to counsel.
Comment: Escobedo made no such enunciation
-if it had there would have been no need for
Miranda. The court here apparently felt that it
did as they held that a warning to defendant after
he had expressed a desire to have counsel could
not insure sufficiently the constitutional right to
counsel. In spite of the fact that defendant, who
had once before excercised his right to terminate
the questioning, answered readily, not confessing
but denying his guilt, the court felt constrained
to hold that such consent was not enough to con-
stitute an effective waiver. In what is perhaps one
of the broader interpretations of Escobedo the
court said:
... we do not rely on Miranda here. Esco-
bedo was decided before this case was tried and
no question of retroactivity is involved....
When a man is held.., after indicating his
desire to arrange for counsel, the F.B.I. should
not return to question him about any phase
of the subject matter until he has an oppor-
tunity to consult a lawyer.... In the circum-
stances of this case he should have been per-
mitted to get an explanation of his rights
from his lawyer and then elect whether to
speak or remain silent.... Reiterations of
such F.B.I. 'warnings' cannot substitute for
professional legal advice....
The best summation of the liberal attitude of the
court here is strikingly provided in its own text:
Thus the right to counsel during the pre-
indictment period, as established by the Esco-
bedo case, means something more than a mere
reiteration of the right to remain silent. As a
general rule, only the fruits of interrogation in
the presence of counsel are constitutionally
admissible at the subsequent trial.
Search And Seizure On Probable Cause-Corn-
gold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
Defendant was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia of receiving and concealing smuggled
watches and of conspiracy. He appealed.
Customs agents saw appellant carrying some
packages into his apartment in Los Angeles and
with the aid of a scintillator determined the pres-
ence of radioactive material within. The agents
followed appellant to the Los Angeles airport
where he was observed carrying the packages to
the Trans World Airlines cargo loading platform.
When appellant left, the agents determined with
the scintillator that radioactive material was
inside the packages. They asked the TWA clerk if
he had the authority to inspect the contents of the
packages. On the basis of the right to inspect
clause on the airline ticket the clerk, with the
approval of his superior, answered affirmatively.
The agents told the clerk that they suspected the
contents of the packages to be smuggled watches
and asked him if he would like to inspect. The
clerk did so with the help of the agents and it was
found that the contents were indeed smuggled
watches. The packages were resealed and allowed
to continue to their New York address. The recipi-
ents of the packages were arrested when they
came to pick them up and the defendant was
arrested shortly thereafter in his office.
On appeal the defendant contended that since
the search was without a warrant and not incident
to an arrest, the fruits of such search were inad-
missible because of the illegality of the search
itself. The Court of Appeals upheld this contention
and reversed the conviction:
"The officers had no warrant, and there are
no circumstances which might have justified
a search without one. No arrest was made to
which a search without a warrant might be
incident. The government made no showing
that the packages might be removed before a
warrant could be obtained.... From the time
appellant left the packages with the carrier in
Los Angeles they were subject to the effective
control of the customs agents. There was
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
nothing to prevent the agents from obtaining
a warrant on proper showing".
The government's principal contention was that
the search was a private one carried out by the
agent of the carrier pursuant to the right reserved
in the contract of carriage. The court rejected this
contention by pointing out that the purpose of the
employee in initiating the search was to aid the
agents, not for any purpose of the airline. Further
they ruled that where the federal agents had a
hand in the search the act was a joint undertaking
and it would be viewed as if the customs agents
had done it entirely on their own.
A forceful dissent by Judge Barnes gives a much
more lengthy recital of the facts, and on the basis
of these he contends that there was indeed a show-
ing that there would not have been time to obtain
a warrant before the flight left. He argued further
that United States v. Blurn, 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1964), relied on by the government for support of
the contention that this was a lawful private
search and dismissed abruptly by the majority,
was directly in point in fact and law and should
therefore control.
Instruction To Jury On Leniency Recommenda-
tion-United States v. Davidson, 367 F. 2d 60 (6th
Cir. 1966). Defendants were convicted in the
United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee of receiving stolen wrenches
belonging to the United States, and valued in
excess of $100, with intent to convert them to their
own use and gain although knowing them to
have been stolen. It was a close case-most of the
government's evidence was circumstantial-and
the jury was deadlocked for three days. The case
was submitted to the jury on Friday afternoon,
the jury requested further instructions on Satur-
day morning whereupon the entire charge was
read again.
The jury reported disagreement at 12:25 P.M.,
whereupon the Allen charge was read and other
remarks made. The jury reported at 3:43 P.M
that it was conclusively deadlocked, whereupon
the judge refused to comment upon the facts. The
jury asked about leniency at 11:15 a.m. Monday,
and was advised by the court that they could
recommend leniency but that their recommenda-
tion would not bind the court, whereupon the
jury resumed deliberations and reached a guilty
verdict one-half hour later.
The circuit court of appeals here reversed the
convictions, holding that such an instruction was
prejudicial in that it was conducive, where the
jury had been deadlocked, to a compromise ver-
dict. The sole function of the jury is to determine
whether defendants are guilty or not, and where
they are unable to reach a decision on this, it is
improper to allow them to look into another area
in order to break the deadlock, said the court.
Tort Theories Of Proximate Cause In The Law
Of Homicide-Commnwealth v. Cheeks, 223 A.2d
291 (Pa. 1966). Defendant was convicted in the
Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia
County of first degree murder and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, this decision was affirmed.
The crime involved the robbery and stabbing of
the deceased on a street by four young males-one
of whom was the defendant. After the attack, the
deceased walked five blocks home where he dis-
covered that he was bleeding slightly from the
stomach. He was taken to the hospital where it
was found that he had a penetrating wound. An
operation was performed to determine the extent
of the wound and it was found to have punctured
the abdominal cavity. The only internal damage,
however, was to the mesentery, a leaf of tissue
attached to the intestines.
In order to prevent a common post-operative
complication-air and secretions in the stomach-
a tube was inserted into this organ via the nostril
to suction of such matter. After coming out of
anesthesia, the deceased was disoriented, unco-
operative, resisted treatment, demonstrated de-
lerium tremens, hallucinations and would not stay
in bed. He was tied to the bed but managed to
pull the tube out three times. Finally a tube with
a mercury sack on the end was inserted. This too
the deceased pulled out with the result that he
had a fit of gagging during which the fluids in his
stomach were coughed into his lungs and he suffo-
cated. There was a disagreement between the
expert witnesses as to whether the post-operative
disorientation was connected to the operation.
This was apparently resolved in the trial court in
the affirmative.
On appeal the defendant contended that he
could not be held for the murder of a man whose
death five days after the attack was caused, not
by the wound, but by the victim's independent
acts. The Supreme Court rejected this contention




".... one charged with homicide cannot escape
liability merely because the blow he inflicted
is not mortal, or the immediate cause of death.
If his blow is the legal cause, i.e. if it started
a chain of causation which led to the death,
he is guilty of homicide.
In this case the stabbing necessitated the
operation; the operation was the direct cause
of the stomach complication...; the insertion
of the tubes was required to alleviate this con-
dition and save the victim's life. The fact that
the victim, while in... a disorientated men-
tal state, pulled out the tubes and created the
immediate situation, which resulted in his
death, is not such an intervening independent
act sufficient to break the chain of causation
or events between the stabbing and the
death."
Comment: As the dissent so appropriately
points out, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
after struggling with this problem in the Alnzeida,'
Thomas,2 and Redline3 cases and being criticized in
a number of law review articles,4 specifically re-
jected this line of reasoning in Commonwealth v.
Root, 403 Pa. 571, 580, 170 A.2d 310, 314 (1961),
where it said:
"the tort liability concept of proximate cause
has no proper place in prosecutions for crim-
inal homicide and a more direct causal connec-
tion is required for conviction."
It seems indeed unfortunate that the court here
has chosen to discard a fifteen year movement
toward a more enlightened position.
Arrest Beyond Borders Of Police Jurisdiction-
People v. Sandoval, 419 P. 2d 187 (Dist. Ct. App.,
Cal. 1966). Defendant was convicted of possession
of heroin. He appealed on the grounds that the
heroin was inadmissible evidence obtained as the
result of an unlawful arrest and search of his
person. The appellate court rejected defendant's
contentions that his arrest was the fruit of an un-
lawful search; that it was made in reliance on
statements of an untested informer; and that the
arresting officers had no authority to arrest him
outside their jurisdiction.
Affirming, the court held that an officer's act in
answering a telephone during the search of a
1362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
2 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 294 (1955).
3 391 Pa 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
4 See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal
Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50 (1956).
residence of a suspect who had just been arrested
on the premises, was lawful, where the officer had
good reason to suspect all incoming calls. Here the
caller, not realizing the officer's identity, informed
him of a pickup of narcotics which was about to be
made. The suspect informed the police of the
caller's identity and the location of the rendezvous.
The officers went to the point, which they realized
was a few blocks outside the Los Angeles city
limits, picked up defendant, searched him, found
the heroin, and arrested him. The court held both
the arrest and the search lawful because the
officers reasonably believed defendant to be the
caller as identified by the informer.
The court also held that the arrest outside the
city limits was lawful under the general principle
that "an officer may pursue a suspected felon into
another jurisdiction and may arrest him there so
long as the arrest is otherwise lawful", even though
the defendant was not known to have committed a
felony within the jurisdiction, and even though he
made no attempt to escape. The principle, said
the court, is not limited to "hot-pursuit" situa-
tions. The officers reasonably believed "that the
defendant had called from, and was waiting at, a
point within the city limits ... thereby com-
mitting several felonies within the city of Los
Angeles", and that he would escape if not imme-
diately apprehended. Such belief was enough to
validate the arrest outside the limits. To prohibit
such arrest would be to make every suburb a
virtual "criminal sanctuary".
Custody And The Miranda Rule-State v.
Intogna, 419 P. 2d 59 (Ariz. 1966). The defendant
was convicted of second degree murder, and
appealed alleging that statements which he made
to the arresting officer were admitted as evidence
in violation of the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
The arresting officer was only a block from the
scene of the shooting, and arrived there within
minutes of the murder. He gave the victim some
first aid, and was informed that the defendant
had run into his home after shooting the victim.
The officer went into the house with his gun out.
He met the defendant at the back door, and
Intogna then said "I am the man you are looking
for." The officer then asked why he shot the
victim, to which the defendant answered: "Be-
cause he was threatening me." These statements
the defendant claimed were inadmissible under
1967]
